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THE SUPREME COURT, THE INTERSTATE
COMMERCE COMMISSION AND THE
FREIGHT RATE BATTLE
J. 0. TALLY,

JR.*

The most significant division on the economic and geographic map
of the United States is that between the highly industrialized Northeast
and the less industrialized remainder of the country. Our domestic
politics might almost be explained in terms of this division.
The South and West are not satisfied to be mainly raw materials
producers. They want to process and manufacture. What prevents
them? The reasons are many and complex. At least one of those reasons 'is that shippers and producers in the Northeast enjoy lower class
freight rates (the rates on which manufactured articles move) than
their opposite numbers in the South and West. Observers disagree as
to whether this is a leading or major reason. But for our purposes the
significant thing is that, for the past several years, strategists for the
South and West have fixed upon this reason with the tenacity of leeches.
Into the issue of freight-rate equalization they have poured virtually
their whole articulation for the development of an industrialized economy in their regions.'
Manifestly this controversy is of large import for economists, sociologists, and politicians; that is to say, the controversy is of substantial
flesh and blood, a live and importuning human problem. Its fascination
extends to law and lawyers. As the problem is whole and human, and
so cuts across politics and economics, similarly it cuts across the divided
organizational parts of our government. For the lawyer the problem
is one of interstate commerce, and it drags in its train individuals, corporations, states, the Congress, courts and commissions. Perhaps no
more apt instance for the study of the interrelation of law and contemporary problems could be found.
The entire freight-rate struggle recently reached crescendo proportions in two decisions, one delivered by the Supreme Court, State of
Georgia v. PennsylvaniaR. R., et al.,2 and one released by the Interstate
*A.B., LL.B., Duke University; LL.M., Harvard University; member North
and South Carolina Bars; Instructor of Law, Wake Forest College.
Carolina
1
SVOGTLE AND KLINE, FREIGHT RATES AND THE SOUTH (Vanderbilt University
Press, 1943); KLINE, FREIGHT RATES: THE INTERREGIONAL TARIFY ISSUE (Vanderbilt University Press, 1942); "The Freight-Rate Battle," Fortune, Vol. XXX,
No. 4, Oct., 1944, p. 149; "The Freight-Rate Decision," N. Y. Times, May 21,
1945, p. 18, col. 3.
2324 U. S. 439 (1945).
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Commerce Commission, No. 28300 Class Rate Investigation, 1939, No.
28310 Consolidated Freight Classification. 3 And the Supreme Court
decision fixes in glaring light the point of paramount interest to lawyers: what is the relation between administrative and judicial law in
this problem? What is the province of the Interstate Commerce Commission? What is the province of the courts?
To set the stage for this examination let us return to the basic
struggle over freight rates. Since Georgia was the plaintiff in the Supreme Court case we may use her as the champion of all partisans for
equalization of freight rates. Georgia has asserted for years that discriminatory freight rates have damaged her economy. She has charged
conspiracy among the railroads, through their rate-making agencies, to
fix high, unfair and non-competitive rates, all tending to penalize Georgia. 4 To go back of what she has done, let us consider the original
choices of action available to Georgia to correct this allegedly unfair
situation. What strategy was open to her?
First, it may be said that her complaint should be "addressed to
Congress,"5' but, as the 294-page Interstate Commerce Commission decision above 6 amply illustrates, this course would entail great conflicts
among interstate economic interests, and the cross currents of politics
would make the solution even less certain. 7 Anyway, whatever relief
might be obtained from Congress would be obtainable through courses
four and five to be outlined.
Second, better or closer regulation of her intrastate rail traffic by
Georgia would not help much since such regulation would not reach the
point of the difficulty. 8 The railroads complained of are interstate,
country-wide.
Third, Georgia could conceivably negotiate, semi-officially, with
specific railroads about certain of her products or raw materials. She
could bargain for better rates to serve certain specific sectors of her
economy. That this solution is not necessarily to be despised is seen
in the fact that the three Pacific Coast states are apparently so well
satisfied with special rates they have obtained for certain of their first
economic interests that they have not even petitioned the Interstate
Commerce Commission for any change in their over-all high freight-rate
situation. 9 However, this solution is in no wise complete or certain,
and may precipitate intrastate fights.
Fourth, Georgia could ask the Interstate Commerce Commission to
"262 I. C. C. 447 (1945).
'Georgia
v. Pennsylvania R. R., et al., 324 U. S. 439, 444 (1945).
5
Id. at 489.
- 262 I. C. C. 447 (1945).
Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce on H. R. 5664, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
'Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. R., et al., 324 U. S.439, 444 (1945).

' "The

Freight-Rate Battle," Fortune, Vol. XXX, No. 4, Oct., 1944, at p. 150.
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cure the alleged freight-rate differentials. This course of action Georgia
pursued. She, along with seven other Southern states, raised the issue
with the Interstate Commerce Commission, and that body, on its own
motions, initiated the allied investigations that resulted after some six
years and voluminous testimony in the aforementioned decision. 10 This
decision was a clear-cut victory for Georgia; in brief the Commission
found that freight class rates and classifications were unlawfully discriminatory against the South and West, and ordered that they be made
uniform throughout the country.
But this decision was, as stated, some six years in coming, and was
not made until after Georgia had started on an alternative or more
fundamental course of action. That further course was prompted by
the following considerations. The Interstate Commerce Commission,
in general, does not set rates. Of course it may do so after hearing on
complaint, or hearing after investigation on its own motion concerning
rates filed with the Commission."- However, in law and in practice, the
rates are initiated by the railroads themselves. 1 2 As is apparent, this
poses the Commission only as a reviewing authority, with full power to
upset, but still dealing with the fait accompli. It has been estimated that
less than one per cent of the rates so made are reviewed by the Commission.13 To fix these rates the railroads have among themselves
agencies and bureaus varying in structure and according to economic
geography. 14 In this situation Georgia saw only an unguaranteed and
tentative relief from the Interstate Commerce Commission. 15 In any
event the Commission's power goes only to rates and not to the ratefixing organizations of the railroads. 1 For example, even if rates have
been fixed by an illegal combine of carriers, the Commission cannot give
relief if those rates are within the "zone of reasonableness.' 7 No relief
can come from the Commission if rates complained of are not outside
18
the proper area of "managerial judgment.'
Furthermore, there can be no doubt, Georgia was prompted by one
other motive-to blast the Interstate Commerce Commission into quicker
action, and action sterner in attitude toward the railroads.' 0 This is
demonstrated in most intemperate language in Georgia's original brief
10 No. 28300 Class Rate Investigation, 1939, No. 28310 Consolidated Freight
Classification, ?62 I. C. C. 447 (1945).
'Interstate Commerce Act, 54 STAT. 911, 912, 49 U. S. C. §15(1) (3) (1940).
" Interstate Commerce Act, 54 STAT. 900, 49 U. S. C. §1(4) (1940); Arizona
Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R., 284 U. S. 379, 384 (1934).
" WIPRUD, JUSTICE IN TRANSPORTATION (1945), 13.
' Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. R., et al., 324 U. S. 439, 443, 457 (1945). For a
history and an explanation of rate bureaus see: Hearings before Committee on
Interstate Commerce on S. 942, 78th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1944).
2 Id. at 460, 481.
Id. at 461.

United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. R., 294 U. S. 499, 506 (1935).

"*Rayon from Bamberg and Nashville, 182 I. C. C. 119, 124 (1932).

2' N. Y. Times, May 21, 1945, p. 18, col. 3.
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in the Supreme Court case which declares "and, WHEREAS, The Interstate Commerce Commission has been and is derelict in its duty, is a
party to the illegal practices herein recited and does condone, aid and
abet them." 20 So Georgia adopted another course of action.
This course, the fifth conceivably open to her, was to pursue her
allegation that the rate-fixing bodies of the railroads were conspiring
illegally to set unfair freight charges, and to sue or have suit brought
against the railroads affecting her. This course of action presented at
least three sub-courses or choices of tactics. Georgia could sue the
railroads concerned in a federal district court under Section 12 of the
Clayton Act.21 She could attempt to invoke the original jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court under the Constitution,2 2 and sue them there. Or
she could persuade the Federal Government to prosecute the railroads
under the antitrust acts. 2 3 Georgia, in the person of Governor Ellis
Arnall, chose to seek to invoke the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court and sue there.
In a five-four decision the Court decided that Georgia could invoke
the Court's original jurisdiction and that the allegations of Georgia, if
proved, constituted a justiciable controversy and stated a good cause
of action.24 The dissenters, led by Mr. Chief Justice Stone, contested
every point along the line of these conclusions 2 5 By contrasting the
majority and minority views on each point one becomes acutely aware
of the Court's conflicting conceptions of the line to be drawn between
the administrative and the judicial treatment of this problem.
Georgia originally filed a bill of complaint dated June 12, 1944, with
the Court.26 This bill asked the Court for an injunction against the
allegedly unlawful rates.2 7 Then, as Mr. Chief Justice Stone says,
"Evidently realizing that all courts are precluded from taking such
action before the Commission has determined the validity of the
rates .
,,,28 Georgia sought to file an amended bill of complaint dated
September 15, 1944.29 On November 6, 1944, the Court issued a rule
to show cause why Georgia should not be permitted to file its amended
bill of complaint. Returns to this rule were made and oral argument
had. 0
Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority, states the essence
of Georgia's amended bill of complaint. 31 Georgia charges'a conspiracy
among the twenty defendant railroads in restraint of trade and commerce. She charges that defendants have fixed arbitrary and non-

10 Brief for complainant on Motion for Leave to File Bill of Complaint, p. 8,
Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. R., et at., 324 U. S. 439 (1945).
' 38 STAT. 736 (1914), 15 U. S. C. §22 (1940).
"U. S. CoNsT., Art. III, §2.
"Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. R., et al.,
324 U. S.439, 489 (1945).
"Id.
at
443-468.
25
Id.
at
468-490.
2"
Id. at
27
at 443,
481. 444.
28Ibid.
2"Id. at 443 n.
30 Id.
at 443,
443. n.
31 Id.
Id.at
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competitive class rates for freight transport, that defendants utilize some
sixty rate bureaus, conferences, etc., to fix these rates and charges, that
no roads can charge any given joint through rates without the approval
of these private agencies, that the rates so fixed are approximately 39
per cent higher than in similar rate situations in the North, and that
the result of the rates so fixed by conspiracy is to frustrate and arrest
the development of Georgia's economy. Georgia sues in two capacities:
(1) as quasi-sovereign or as agent and protector of her people, and
(2) as a proprietor to redress wrongs suffered by the state as owner of
a railroad and as owner and operator of various state institutions. She
prays for damages and injunctive relief.
In treating this case the Court first faced this issue: Can Georgia
invoke the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under the Constitution which provides, inter alia, that "In all Cases . . . in which a
State shall be Party, the Supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction" ?32 This divides itself into two inquiries. (1) Can Georgia invoke
such original jurisdiction in her capacity as parens patriae? (2) Can
Georgia invoke such original jurisdiction in her proprietary capacity?
The Court majority defined the limits of inquiry (1) as follows:
The original jurisdiction of the Court is confined to cases of a civil, not
a criminal, nature.8 3 A state may not prosecute a suit under the original
jurisdiction that is in reality for the benefit of particular individuals.3 4
And a state may not represent, parens patriae, its citizens in their relations with the Federal Government. The latter is parens patriaethere.,35
The majority'then answered inquiry (1) in the affirmative. "It
seems to us clear that . . . Georgia may maintain this suit as parens
patriae acting on behalf of her citizens.. .. ,,36 The cases relied on for
this assertion indicate that, in general, a State may sue in its quasisovereign capacity to protect its citizens.3 7 However, none of these
cases involved a suit parens patriae concerning interstate freight rates.
Scoring this lack of in-point authority, the Court minority replied:
"And many years ago it was established by decisions of this
Court, whose authority has remained unimpaired until discarded
by the opinion of the Court just announced, that a State does not
U. S. CONST., Art. III, §2.
Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. R., et al., 324 U. S. 439, 446 (1945) ; Wisconsin v.
*
Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U. S. 265, 297-300 (1888).

" Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. R., et al., 324 U. S. 439, 446 (1945) ; Jones cx. rel.,
Louisiana v. Bowles, 322 U. S. 707 (1944); Oklahoma v. Cook, 304 U. S. 387
(1938); Oklahoma v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R., 220 U. S. 277 (1911).
" Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. L, et al., 324 U. S. 439, 446 (1945) ; Florida v.
Mellon, 273 U. S. 12 (1927) ; Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923).
" Georgia v. Pennsylvania R., at al., 324 U. S. 439, 450 (1945).
"North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U. S. 365 (1923); Pennsylvania v. West
Virginia, 262 U. S. 553 (1923) ; New York v. New Jersey, 256 U. S. 296 (1921) ;
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U. S. 230 (1907) ; Missouri v. Illinois, 180
U. S. 208 (1901).
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stand in such relation to its citizens and inhabitants as to enable
it to maintain an original suit in this Court to protect them by
injunction from injuries to the State's economy resulting from the
38
maintenance of unlawful interstate freight rates."
Two cases are cited as authority.3 9 It is lelieved that these cases may
be distinguished. Thus in Oklahoma v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R., Oklahoma, in effect, was attempting to force the rails to comply with Oklahoma statutory rates and the pertinent language of the decision 40 was
that the Constitutional provision on the Court's original jurisdiction was
". .. not to be interpreted as conferring such jurisdiction in every
cause in which the State elects to make itself strictly a party plaintiff
of record and seeks not to protect its own property, but only to vindicate the wrongs of some of its people or to enforce its own laws or
public policy against wrongdoers .generally." 41 And in Oklahoma v.
Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. the Court followed this rule and flatly stated that
the holding of Oklahoma v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R., was that a state
cannot, under the Court's original jurisdiction, sue parens patriae
"against the violations of its laws by the corporations or persons sued."2
Here Georgia is not suing only to vindicate the wrongs of some of its
people or to enforce its own laws or public policy. Accordingly, it is
submitted that the Court majority's citation of Oklahoma v. Atchison,
T. & S. F. R. R. and Oklahoma v. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. R. as authority for
the limitation that suits in the name of a state may not be for the benefit
of particular individuals 43 is a fairer reference than the minority's citation of those cases as authority that a state may not sue against the
maintenance of unlawful interstate freight rates. Anyway the minority
seem off the point since Georgia is suing against the maintenance of
unlawful freight rate organizations rather than unlawful freight rates.
However, the Court minority give a broader negation to Georgia's
right to sue parens patriae. They say: "It has long been settled by the
decisions of this Court that a State is without standing to maintain suit
for injuries sustained by its citizens and inhabitants for which they may
sue in their own behalf." 44 Four cases, besides Oklahoma v. Atchison,
T. & S. F. R. R. just dealt with, are cited to support this contention.
Again it is submited that these cases are distinguishable. Thus New
Hampshire v. Louisiana45 went solely on the ground that a state could
"'Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. R., et aL., 324 U. S. 439, 473 (1945).
"Oklahoma v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R., 220 U. S. 277 (1911) ; cf. Oklahoma
v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry., 220 U. S.290, 301 (1911).
40 220 U. S. 277, 289 (1911).
"Emphasis supplied.
"2220 U. S. 290, 301 (1911).
" Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. R., et aL, 324 U. S. 439, 446 (1945) ; Jones ex. reL
Louisiana v. Bowles, 322 U. S. 707 (1944); Oklahoma v. Cook, 304 U. S. 387
(1938) ; Oklahoma v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R., 220 U. S. 277 (1911).
"Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. R., et al., 324 U. S.439, 473 (1945).

5 108 U. S.76 (1883).
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not sue another state to collect debts owed particular citizens and
thereby circumvent the Eleventh Amendment. The advancement by
state suit of the causes of particular individuals was the point in Louisiana v. Teaxas46 and Oklahoma v. Cook.47 And in Jones ex rel. Louisiana v. Bowles48 leave to file an original suit which sought to protect
Louisiana citizens against a federal law was denied without opinion.
Yet again the Court minority declare that the Federal Government, not Georgia, is parens patriae in this suit situation because "the
federal government alone stands in such relationship to the citizens and
inhabitants of the United States, as to permit the brihging of suit in
their behalf, to protect them from the violation of federal laws relating
to interstate commerce.$ 49 Again the cases cited50 do not seem to the
writer to bear the weight of the assertion. In each of the cases cited
a state was trying to attack the validity of a federal law or regulation.
There is no such question in Georgia's case.
As to inquiry (2), whether Georgia can invoke the Court's original
jurisdiction in her proprietary capacity, the majority treat this as unimportant beside the state's right to sue parens patriae, and call her right
to sue in her proprietary capacity a mere "makeweight,"' 1 echoing with
approval Mr. Justice Holmes verbal evaluation of that right in an
earlier parens patriae suit. 52 The Court minority consider that by so
designating this subsidiary right of Georgia to sue, the majority have
removed it as an issue, and, accordingly, the minority do not reply on
53
that point.
Assuming Georgia's right to invoke the Court's original jurisdiction
to be recognized, the second question in logical sequence before the Court
was whether, nevertheless, the case should be remanded, without preju54
dice, for trial in a district court.
The Court majority fix the limits of this question as follows :r The
Court's original jurisdiction is not exclusive,5" nor its exercise mandatory, but rather it is discretionary. 57 And Section 12 of the Clayton
Act5 8 provided that suit under the antitrust laws may be brought not
47 304 U. S. 387 (1938).
U.S.1 (1900).
46176
4
s322 U. S. 707 (1944).

Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. R., et al., 324 U. S. 439, 474 (1945).
toJones ex reL. Louisiana v. Bowles, 322 U. S. 707 (1944) ; Florida v. Mellon,
; Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923).
273 ,U.S. 12 (1927)
xGeorgia v. Pennsylvania R. RL, et al., 324 U. S. 439, 450 (1945).
2
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U. S. 230, 237 (1907).
Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. L,et al., 324 U. S. 439, 473 (1945).

,Id. at 465, 470.

" Id. at 464.

sPlaquenines Tropical Fruit Co. v. Henderson, 170 U. S. 511 (1898) ; Ames
v. Kansas, 111 U. S.449 (1884).
" Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U. S.1 (1939) ; Oklahoma v. Cook, 304 U. S.
(1938) ; Georgia v. Chattanooga, 264 U. S.472, 473, 483 (1924).
387,58396
38 STAT. 736 (1914) 15 U. S. C. §22 (1940).

19471

THE FREIGHT RATE BATTLE

only in the home district. of the corporation complained of but in any
district "wherein it may be found or transacts business...."
Answering this question the majority opinion takes the position that
there is no clear showing in the record that all twenty defendants could
be found in some convenient district court forum, and "once a State
makes out a case which comes within our original jurisdiction... there
is no requirement that it go further and show that no other forum is
available to it." 59
It is submitted that the minority answer to this question, to the contrary effect, is more convincing. Mr. Chief Justice Stone states that "no
reason appears" why the suit should not, from the standpoint of the
witnesses and the parties, be as conveniently brought in a district court,
and he views the case as "preeminently one" which the Supreme Court,
"inthe interest of a more efficient administration of justice" should refuse to entertain.60 To the majority's statement that Georgia, having
qualified to invoke the Court's original jurisdiction, need go no further
and show lack of another convenient forum, Mr. Chief Justice Stone
replies that "this puts the shoe on the wrong foot. It is Georgia which
seeks to invoke our equity jurisdiction to hear this case .

.

. " and

Georgia must show that she is unable to reach "all the defendants in a
convenient district.""'- He goes on to point out that, although invited
upon argument to do so, Georgia has made no such showing. And
from standard works of reference such as Moody's Steam Railroadsand
telephone directories, he reports, it can be determined where the defendants can be "found" or where they "transact business," and that
on the basis of their being found or transacting business in any district
they may be sued there under Section 12 of the Clayton Act.62 Noting
that, in a side issue of the case, two of the defendants may be dropped
for lack of diversity of citizenship as to them, he states that in any of
six district courts which he names Georgia may get at as many defend63
ants as she can in the Supreme Court.
These important, but preliminary, questions settled, the next question reached is the gravamen of the case. Does Georgia state a cause
of action under the federal antitrust laws ? Any cause of action on
the common law that Georgia may have is called ".

.

. fainthearted and

unconvincing .. ." by the minority 64 and the question of the existence
of such a cause is not reached by the majority. 65
" Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. R., et al., 324 U. S. 439, 466 (1945).
" Id.at 470; Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U. S. 1, 17-20

(1939) ; Oklahoma
v. Cook, 304 U. S.387, 396 (1938) ; Georgia v. Chattanooga, 264 U. S. 472, 483
(1924); North Dakota v. Chicago & N. W. R. R., 257 U. S. 485 (1922).
" Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. R., et al., 324 U. S. 439, 470 (1945).
SIbid.
Id. at 471.
'Id. at 469.
" Id. at 462 n. This concern is rather pointless since the Court has recognized
that the Sherman Act has broader application than common law prohibition of
restraints of trade, Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274, 297 (1908).
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The outer limits of this basic question are rather harmoniously
marked off by majority and minority opinions. Majority6 and minority67 recognize that Georgia is a "person" under Section 16 of the Clayton Act, and so, other conditions being met, may sue to restrain violations of the antitrust laws. 68 There is no disputing that common carriers,
subject to the Interstate Commerce Act, and conspiracies among any
common carriers to fix rates, are subject to the antitrust laws.6 9 Consequently, there is no questioning that the United States as plaintiff
might proceed against such defendants as are here involved in a suit
7
such as this. 0
The Court majority affirm that Georgia's suit would not lie in the
Supreme Court to "review, annul, or set aside an order" of the Interstate Commerce Commission.71 The method provided by Congress for
obtaining that sort of relief, by administrative action and judicial r6view, is exclusive of all other remedies. 72 This is an affirmation of the
familiar Abilene doctrine. 73 Furthermore, the Commission has jurisdiction and the statutory duty to enforce compliance by common car74
riers under its regulation with certain of the Clayton Act's provisions.
And an order of the Commission may not be sued against, even on the
ground of its violating the antitrust laws, -by anyone except the United
States. 75 It is conceded that the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended,
provides for the establishment of joint through rates by common carriers
and for agreement among carriers on such rates. 76 But the Court holds,
and without refutation, that conspiracies such as here charged, with
their resultant discrimination and coercion, are not sanctioned.77 Further without refutation, the Court holds that the Interstate Commerce
Commission is not empowered to control and supervise rate-fixing combinations per se, or to put an end to their activities ;78 and the Court
takes significant notice of the fact that three times Congress has been
presented with, but has not adopted, proposals to legalize and place
under the Commission's supervision rate-fixing agencies.70
"Id. at 447.
67 Id. at 475.
"Georgia v. Evans, 316 U. S. 159.
"United States v. Southern Pacific Co., 259 U. S. 214 (1922) ; United States
v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U. S. 505 (1898); United States v. Trans-Missouri
Freight Ass'n, 166 U. S. 290 (1897).
" Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. R., et at., 324 U. S. 439, 456, 489 (1945).
72 Id. at 454.

7 Ibid.

Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426 (1907).
Georgia v. Pennsylvania R R., et at., 324 U. S. 439, 456 n. (1945).
5
I at 454.
1d.
'

7854 STAT. 900, 49 U. S. C. §1(4) (1940).

" Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. R., et a[., 324 U. S. 439, 457 (1945).
"Id. at 456.
"Ibid. On the thesis that Congress intended for railroad rate-making conferences to be subject to the Sherman Act, see Wiprud, JuscE n; TRANSPORTATION
(1945), 110-113, giving a succinct pre-enactment and post-enactment legislative
history of the Sherman Act with reference to this point. As to the possible future
intention of Congress see note 130 infra.
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In further accord with the minority the Court makes short shrift of
Georgia's prayer for damages. It is clear, Mr. Justice Douglas says,
that "Georgia may not recover damages even if the conspiracy alleged
is shown to exist."8' 0 As reason for this holding he cites Keogh v.
Chicago & N. W. R. R. and quotes the Court in that case:
"This stringent rule prevails, because otherwise the paramount
purpose of Congress-prevention of unjust discrimination-might
be defeated. If a shipper could recover under Section 7 of the
Antitrust Act for damages resulting from the exaction of a rate
higher than that which would otherwise have prevailed, the amount
recovered might, like a rebate, operate to give him a preference
over his trade competitors.""'But Georgia's prayer for injunctive relief remains. And, after noting this large area of agreement, one may see at once that the fundamental issue upon which the case was decided is the interpretation and
application of Section 16 of the Clayton Act,8 2 reading, in its pertinent
parts, as follows:
"Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled
to sue for and have injunctive relief, in any court of the United
States having jurisdiction over the parties, against threatened loss
or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws . . . when and under
the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief against
threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is granted, by
courts of equity, under the rules governing such proceedings....
Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to entitle any person, firm, corporation, or association, except the
United States, to bring suit in equity for injunctive relief against
any common carrier subject to the provisions of the act to regulate
commerce, approved February fourth, eighteen hundred and
eighty-seven, in respect of any matter subject to the regulation,
supervision, or other jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce
Commission."
In interpretation the Court holds that the rate-making organizations
complained of are not "matter subject to the regulation, supervision,
or other jurisdiction" of the Commission.8 In expatiation of this major
point Mr. Justice Douglas quotes from Central Transfer Co. v. Terminal R. Assn. as follows:
"True a contract may precede and have existence apart from the
several acts required to perform it, and conceivably all those acts
might be done if no contract or agreement to perform them had
80

at 453.
81260 U. S. 156, 163 (1922).
"38Id.
STAT. 737 (1914), 15 U. S. C. §26 (1940).
Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. R., et al., 324 U. S.439, 455 (1945).
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ever existed. But when they are done in performance of an agreement, there is no way by which the agreement itself can be assailed
by injunction except by restraining acts done in performance of it.
That, in this case, the statute forbids, not because the contract is
within the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission,
but because the acts done in performance of it, which must necessarily be enjoined if any relief is 4given, are matters subject to the
8
jurisditcion of the Commission."
The seeming affinity between the case there involved of a contract
complained of because of the allegedly unfair rates that flowed from
it and the case here in which Georgia complains of collusion from which
unfair rates allegedly flow, Mr. Justice Douglas explains away to his
own satisfaction by saying that an injunction to end the conspiracy here
charged need not "enjoin operation under established rates as would
have been the case had injunction issued" in Central Transfer Co. v.
Terminal R. Assn. to prevent performance of the contract.8s
The minority opinion rejects by implication the distinguishing of
Georgia's case from the Central Transfer case and says that the latter
should control the present decision.86 The minority impute inconsistency
to the majority by saying: "But as the Court seems to recognize even
the amended. complaint contains allegations and raises issues as to
whether the rates charged by the defendants are discriminatory."' 7 The
minority call the change of complaint from rates to rate-fixing a "verbal
maneuver" ;88 and assert that the rates fixed and the rate-fixing are inseparable and, therefore, there is inextricably involved "matter subject"
to the Interstate Commerce Commission, so that Georgia is not stating
a cause of action in the Supreme Court. 9
On the application of Section 16 of the Clayton Act the majority
find that Georgia's case meets all the equitable requirements alluded to
in that section. This would seem to follow inevitably from acceptance
of the rationale of Georgia's case that rate-fixing may be separated from
the rates fixed. The Court says:
"If it is shown that the alleged combination exists and uses coercion in the fixing of joint through rates, only an injunction
aimed at future conduct of that character can give adequate reIt will supply as effective remedy without which there
lief ....
can be only an endless effort to rectify the continuous injury inflicted by the unlawful combination. The threatened injury is clear.
The damage alleged is sufficient to satisfy the preliminary requirements of this motion to file. There is no administrative control
288 U. S. 469, 476 (1923).
85
Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. R., et al., 324 U. S. 439 (1945).
8
' Id. at 485.
88 Ibid.
TId. at 481.
Id. at 485.

1947]

THE FREIGHT RATE BATTLE

over the combination. And no adequate or effective remedy other
than this suit is suggested which Georgia can employ to eliminate
from rate-making the influences of the unlawful conspiracy alleged
to exist here."90
Similarly it would seem to follow inevitably from the minority's
rejection of the separation rationale of Georgia's case that they would
find Georgia not meeting the requirements of a suit in equity. The
minority hammer their points that (1) a "plaintiff must show threatened injury . . . "1"(2) "for which he is without other adequate remedy... ,,,02(3) and "for which a court of equity is able to provide a
remedy" ;93 (4) but "Courts cannot enjoin, in general terms, violations
of the Sherman Act, without specifying what acts are to be enjoined as
violations" ;4 (5) consequently, "It is the duty of this Court to dismiss
an original suit in which it cannot make an effective decree." 9 5
And all these points of law apply to this case, the minority say,
because (1) "unless Georgia can show that the present rates are unlawful, or that some other rate structure, which could be substituted for
that now in force, would be just and reasonable, which Georgia cannot
do without prior resort to the Commission, it cannot show that any other
structure could lawfully exist or that any injury to it is threatened by
the conspiracy" ;91 and, therefore, (2) "the State has not availed itself
of or exhausted the administrative remedies provided by the Interstate
Commerce Act, which may afford an adequate remedy and which must in
any case precede the institution of the present suit in equity" ;9T consequently, again, (3) "It is futile to attempt to enjoin a conspiracy to fix
rates because of their injurious effects on the plaintiff, unless it is known
that they are unlawful or will be and unless the Court is free to determine the point," which it is not.98
The majority evaluate all their syllogistic conclusions from the major
premise of the separability of rate-fixing from the rates fixed as follows:
90
91Id.
1d. at
at 462.
475; Duplex Printing Co. v. During, 254 U. S. 443, 464, 465 (1921);
Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U. S.459, 471 (1917); Vicksburg Waterworks
Co. 92v. Vicksburg, 185 U. S. 65, 82 (1902).
Georgia v. Pensylvania R. R., et al., 324 U. S. 439, 475 (1945); Myers v.
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S.41 (1938); Schoenthal v. Irving Trust
Co., 287 U. S. 92, 94 (1932); Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521, 525, 526
(1932).
"Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. R., et al., 324 U. S.439, 477 (1945) ; Texas v.
Florida, 306 U. S.398, 405 (1939).
"Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. R., et al., 324 U. S.439, 485 (1945) ; Swift & Co.
v. United States, 276 U. S. 311, 328 (1928) ; Swift & Co. v. United States, 196
U. S.375, 396 (1905) ; cf. National Labor Relations Board v. Express Publishing
Co., 312 U. S.426 (1941); New York, N. H. & H. R. v. Interstate Commerce
Commission, 200 U. S.361, 404 (1906).
" Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. R., et al., 324 U. S.439, 487 (1945) ; Arizona v.
California, 298 U. S.558, 572 (1936).
"'Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. R., et al., 324 U. S.439, 476 (1945).
97 Ibid.

IsId.at 487.
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"That is not to undercut or impair the primary jurisdiction of the
Conimission over rates. It is to free the rate-making function of
the influences of a conspiracy over which the Commission has no
authority but which if proven to exist can only hinder the Commission in the tasks with which it is confronted." 99
The minority, from all their syllogistic conclusions from the major
premise that rate-fixing is inseparable from the rates fixed, evaluate the
Court's decision as follows:
In suits like this one "The entry of decrees for the plaintiffs could
only mean the breakdown of the unified system of fixing rates by
Commission action, which Congress has ordained by the Interstate
Commerce Act."' 0 0
This language puts succinctly the feeling expressed throughout the
minority's opinion, that the Court is callously overturning precedent and
the intent of Congress to give Georgia the relief needed. It can scarcely
be denied that the Court's decision is overturning dicta as to the Court's
understanding of the intent of Congress. For example, in Terminal
Warehouse Co. v. PennsylvaniaR. R., the Court, in words evocative of
those just quoted from the dissent, said:
"If a sufferer from the discriminatory acts of carriers by rail or
water may sue for an injunction under the Clayton Act without
resort in the first instance to the regulatory commission, the unity
of the system of regulation breaks down beyond repair."''
However, the plea in that case was for damages, not an injunction. And
the hard, core question in the Georgia case of the separability of rates
and rate-making was not involved. Nor has it any precise precedent in
any other case ever to come to the Court.
And, after all, these evaluations of the Court's decision in the instant
case are, by nature, predictions. Predictions are hard to assess. And
the assessing is but another prediction, that of the assessor. Certainly
one may recognize that the difficulties inherent in proving that certain
railroad combinations have unlawfully conspired to fix unlawful rates
are great. Thus, on the issue of unlawful rates, it was a minor irony of
this case that the very rates Georgia complained of were rates previously
approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission. 0 2 And rates
approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission are of course lawful
rates.

103

To turn to the unlawful fixing of rates, it is settled that such rate100
1d. at 490.
99
Id. at 460.
101297 U. S. 500, 513 (1936).
12 No. 28300 Class Rate Investigation, 1939, No. 28310 Consolidated Freight
262 I. C. C. 447, 516, 517 (1945).
Classification,
103 Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. R., et at., 324 U. S. 439, 453 (1945) ; Keogh v.
Chicago & N. W. R. R., 260 U. S. 156, 163 (1922).
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fixing by carriers may be repugnant to the antitrust laws even though
the rates fixed are lawful.10 4 But the difficulties attending proof of
illegal conspiracy through rate bureaus may be equally embarrassing.
Some may think as the defendants in the Georgia case say in one of
their briefs, that ever since United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight
Assn. 0 5 and United States v. Joint Traffic Assn. 0 8 when "the railroads
revised their rate-making organizations so as to preserve to individual
roads the right of independent action, and until the decision of this
Court granting leave to plaintiff to file this complaint, it had been generally believed, by railroads, shippers, and regulatory authorities alike,
that the antitrust acts were without application to the normal making of
rates by the bureau method."'10

7

Another touch of irony is added on

this head by the action of the Commission, after decreeing, roughly,
equalization of class rates and classifications, in inviting the railroads
s
"by their own collective action" to initiate such uniform classification.10
There are ample warnings as quoted by Mr. Dickinson, 109 general
0o'United States v. Southern Pacific Co., 259 U. S. 214 (1922) ; United States
v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U. S. 505 (1898); United StAtes v. Trans-Missouri
Freight
Ass'n, 166 U. S.290 (1897).
105 166 U. S. 290 (1897).
100171 U. S. 505 (1898).

107 Reply brief of Northern Defendents to Brief of the State of Georgia in
Opposition to Defendants' Motion for More Definite Statement or for Bill of

Particulars, p. 10, Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. R., et aL., 324 U. S.439 (1945). Since

no amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act or the Antitrust Laws exists to
support this assertion, it must be presumed that the defendants believe that the
Antitrust Laws have been repealed by implication so far as rate-making is concerned. This repeal-by-implication argument has been definitely answered by the
court. And the court's answers have been effectively marshaled in WIPRUD, JusTicF iN TRANSPORTATION (1945), 113, 114 as follows:
In its decision in the Borden case, United States v. Borden, 308 U. S. 188,
198, 199 (1939), the Court had the following to say regarding repeals by implication: "It is a cardinal principle of construction that repeals by implication are
not favored. When there are two acts upon the same subject the rule is to give
effect to both if possible .... The intention of the legislature to repeal 'must be
clear and manifest.' . . . It is not sufficient, as was said by Mr. Justice Story in
Wood v. United States . . . 'to establish that subsequent laws cover some or even
all of the cases provided for by (the prior act), for they may be merely affirmative
or cumulative, or auxiliary.' There must be 'a positive repugnancy between the
provisions of the new law, and those of the old; and even then the old law is
repealed by implication only pro tanto to the extent of the repugnancy."'
•.. "Regulated" industries are not per se exempt from the Sherman Act. The
regulatory statute must provide for relief in specific terms and those terms must
be followed before immunity can be obtained from the prohibitions of the Sherman
Act. In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, the Court
stated at page 226: "Congress had specified the precise manner and method of
securing immunity. None other would suffice."
It is interesting to note that Wiprud's words and quotations are repeated almost verbatim in the Justice Department's brief in the Georgia Case, Brief for
the United States Amicus Curiae as to Jurisdiction, pp. 21, 22; and by the Court
majority
in the Georgia Case, 324 U. S. at 456.
I"0 No. 28300 Class Rate Investigation, 1939, No. 28310 Consolidated Freight
Classification, 262 I. C. C. 447, 511 (1945).
100

Dickinson, "Railroad Rates and the Antitrust Laws" (1945)

PPAcr. J. 936.

12 I. C. C.
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counsel for the Pennsylvania Railroad Co., that this delicate system of
rate-making must not be made to lie in a Procrustean bed.
Thus the Interstate Commerce Commission:
"It would be dangerous to the successful existence of railroad
companies for them to make or be required to make freight rates
upon mere theories. They have to deal with business as they find
it."1o

And Mr. Sharfman:
"No single clear-cut principle of rate-control emerges through
which the hundreds of thousands of transportation charges, involving every type of commodity and every locality in the country
can be rationalized; no simple formula is available . . . through
which maladjustments can be automatically removed and the public interest universally furthered.""1

And the late Interstate Commerce Commissioner, Mr. Eastman:
"It is important to keep in mind that if the rate bureaus and associations did not exist and rate initiations were wholly the function
of the individual railroads, there would be thousands of com-

munities which would be... at the mercy of a single railroad....
If I know anything from experience with certainty, it is that if
we rely upon competition as the governing factor in the determination of freight rates by all types or any type of carrier, the benefits
will go to the shippers2 in proportion to the size of the traffic club
that they can wield."1
But all these difficulties may be more apparent than real, or no more
real than the difficulties of proof and the seeming conflict between administrative and judicial law in any other antitrust suit against common
carriers. The Court impliedly recognizes what is involved, practically,
in enforcement. In the instant case Mr. Justice Douglas says:
"The collaboration contemplated in the fixing of through and joint
rates is of a restrictive nature. We do not stop at this stage of
the proceedings to delineate the legitimate area in which that collaboration may operate."" 3
In this expression of sanctioned "collaboration" that is, nevertheless,
"of a restrictive nature," the Court may be giving the complete, if vague,
formula it intends to apply to the difficulties of such cases. There is not
necessarily involved wholesale destruction of railroad rate-making
machinery. It may be, as the Court decided, that Georgia asks and the
Evans v. Oregon Railroad & Navigation Co., 1 I. C. C. 641, 646 (1887).

"'

,
112

III-B SHARFMAIN, THME INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMIssION (1936) 327.
Hearings before Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 942, 78th Cong.,

1st Sess. (1944) 823.
11" Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. R., et at., 324 U. S. 439, 457 (1945).
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Court can give simply the dissolution of certain bureaus complained of
or the confinement to legitimate activities of certain of the bureaus complained of, and that such action will simply "restore that degree of

competition envisaged by Congress."' 1 4 Certainly Congress did intend
to preserve a degree of competition among common carriers. 115

And to Georgia the case may now very well be just another action
against rate-fixing combinations such as were involved in United States
v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn.11 6 and United States v. Joint Traffic
Assn.117 The fact that at the time of those cases the Interstate Commerce Commission had no power to prescribe rates"18 does not reach the
basic issue in the Georgia case. Nor does the "rule of reason" of the
Supreme Court, declaring that only those contracts or combinations
unreasonably in restraint of interstate commerce are prohibited by the
antitrust laws, seem to do more than beg the question in Georgia's case;
and, in fact, the Court has held that this rule of reason is not applicable
to a situation like that in the Georgia case."19
And as in the Freight Association cases the Court may simply find
that, in Georgia's case, certain activities of the combinations involved
are forbidden by the antitrust laws. One may still consider that the
only novel point of the case is that Georgia, as a "person," is allowed
to bring a suit for injunctive relief against common carriers, themselves
subject to the Interstate Commerce Act. And the Court's decision may
seem epoch-making and seem to involve a conflict between administrative
and judicial functions only because, in no previous case had a plaintiff
so insistently and ingeniously alleged that injunctive relief was sought
only against a rate-making conspiracy, and not against the rates thus
made, as to convince the Court. Certainly Georgia need no longer feel
that she is charting an unknown course. To transpose Mr. Justice
Holmes' renowned words, the great hard case, that may or may not
have made bad law, has been won. The rest is much easier. Hereafter,
-'Id.
at 461. Commerce Act, 54 Stat. 899, 49 U. S. C. §§1(4)
"IZInterstate
(5) (6), 6(1)
(3) (1940) ; Transportation Act of 1940, 54 STAT. 899, 49 U. S. C. note preceding
§1 (1940); see Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R., 284 U. S.370
(1932); 1 SIARPMAx, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION (1931) 81. And

see note 78 supra.
166 U. S. 290 (1897).
171 U. S.505 (1898).

still live law see

On the thesis that these freight association cases are

WIPRUD, JUsTIcE

IN TRANSPORTATION (1945), Appendix B, for a

collection of all the cases in which the Supreme Court has followed or approved
its 1decisions
freight association
" Georgiainv.thePennsylvania
R. R., etcases.
aL., 324 U. S.439, 490 (1945).
..The so-called Rule of Reason was enunciated in Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U. S. 1 (1911).

In U. S. v. Trenton Potteries Co., et al., 273 U. S.

392, 397, 398 (1927) the Court made it clear that price fixing agreements are
per se bad under the Antitrust Laws and that the Rule of Reason cannot be
applied to them.
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1

in the proof of her suit, 20 Georgia follows the usual pattern of a suit
under the antitrust laws.
In this connection the doctrinal regularity of Georgia's case may
21
have been enhanced by the Interstate Commerce Commission decision,
which followed the Supreme Court decision. In this decision, called
the "most important in its history,"'122 the Commission found, as stated,
that the class rates and classifications .complained of "as a whole, are,
and for the future will be unjust and unreasonable, in violation of Section 1(4) and (6) of the Act."' - This may relieve some of the minority's embarrassment on the score of giving Georgia equitable relief
before Georgia had proved injury, actual or threatened, which could
be proved only by Interstate Commerce Commission determination.
Now the rates have been found unlawful; Georgia would seem to have
proved injury.
In pressing the distinction between rates and how they are fixed at
every opportunity, as he did shortly after this Commission decision in
a statement that the railroads were already conspiring to get around the
new ruling,12 4 Governor Arnall may further sustain and improve the
regularity of his case in the general and the official mind. To Governor
Arnall the need for the further Supreme Court action is clear: he says
that the Supreme Court should follow the good done by the Commission
decision and "complete the job of freeing the transportation system of
America from monopoly, conspiracy, and fraud.... So Georgia's case,
having served one good purpose, will proceed to serve another.' 125 The
Supreme Court may agree fully with him.
Certainly we must say that Georgia's strategy has been eminently
successful. From the Interstate Commerce Commission, in the first allimportant round, she has won, in large part, the rates she wanted. And
from the Supreme Court she is in a very fair way to get assurance that
those rates cannot be corrupted by railroad organizations.
But should the final decision in the Supreme Court be unsatisfactory, her best word of advice would seem to have been given by the
minority of the Court.126 The simplest fundamental course in the first
12 0

Petition for rehearing on leave to file in the instant case was denied April

23, 1945, 324 U. S. 890 (1945). And on March 18, 1946, Georgia presented her
briefs for proof of the facts in the case to the Special Master of the Court,
N. Y. Times, March 20, 1946, p. 7, col. 1.
'2No. 28300 Class Rate Investigation, 1939, No. 28310 Consolidated Freight
Classification, 262 I. C. C. 447 (1945).
12 N. Y. Times, May 20, 1945, p. 1, col. 1.
128 No. 28300 Class Rate Investigation, 1939, No. 28310 Consolidated Freight
Classification, 262 I. C. C. 447, 509 (1945). For a summary analysis and appreciation of this decision see "Important Recent Decision by the Commission in the
Class Rate and Consolidated Freight Classification Proceedings" (1945) 12 1. C. C.
PRAcT. J. 1015.
12, N. Y. Times, May 24, 1945, p. 27, col. 4.
122 N. Y. Times, May 20, 1945, p. 26, col. 3.
2'Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. R., et al., 324 U. S. 439, 489 (1945).
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place would have been to persuade the Federal Government to execute
its duties under the antitrust laws and sue the railroads concerned. Already the Department of Justice is suing forty-seven western railroads
on allegations substantially the same as those in Georgia's case. 127 And,
if Georgia fails in her spectacular Supreme Court suit, her last best
hope will be to have Washington accomplish for her what she could
not do for herself.
All the foregoing has dealt primarily with the propriety, under present statutory law and judicial decisions on that law, of Georgia's strategy
in attacking railroad rate-making agencies for alleged violations of the
antitrust laws. Stated otherwise, the concern thus far has been with
present law and how it has been and may be interpreted. It would not
be fitting to close this consideration without making explicit what is
apparent from any close study of this subject; namely, that, much more
important than present law and controversy raging about it, is future
law, in a word, policy.
This is the most fundamental part of the freight-rate battle. And
this future policy is fundamental to the Georgia case and to the Department of Justice case alike. The question of this bedrock policy was
cogently stated by the Supreme Court as far back as United States v.
Trans-MissouriFreight Assn. when the Court said:
"It may be that the policy evidenced by the passage of the Act
[Sherman Act] itself will, if carried out, result in disaster to the
roads and in failure to secure the advantages sought from such
legislation. Whether that will be the result or not we do not know
and cannot predict. These considerations are, however, not for us.
If the Act ought to read as contended by the defendants, Congress
is the body to amend it and not the courts ....112
And in the Georgia case Mr. Chief Justice Stone said that the essence
of the dispute involved was "a grievance of a section of the country
which should be adagainst an existing federal system of rate-making,
129
dressed to Congress rather than to this Court. .
In sum, the lines of the freight-rate battle have not changed since the
turn of the century. The determination of all antitrust litigation against
common carriers still stumbles over a dispute about Congressional intent
as to the application of the antitrust laws to common carriers which are
under the aegis of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
In reviving this hoary difficulty the Georgia suit and the Department
of Justice suit have precipitated another proposal in Congress, known as
the Bulwinkle Bill, to fix clearly a Congressional intent to immunize the
27
2 N. Y. Times, August 24, 1944, p. 1, col. 3; N. Y. Times, November 17,
1945,28 p.16627,U.col.
S. 2.
290, 340 (1897).
129 Georgia v. Pennsylvania P. R., et al., 324 U. S. 439, 489 (1945).
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rate-making functions of common carriers from the normal operation of
the antitrust laws, that is, from suit by the Department of Justice, and
to place such functions under the comprehensive supervision and control
of the Interstate Commerce Commission with responsibility upon the
Commission to enforce the spirit and policy of the antitrust laws.180
On the score of policy in the freight-rate situation this may be the
all-wise and precisely needed thing to do. However, success for Georgia
in her suit might seem superficially to serve Georgia, and, however, success for the Department of Justice in its suit might seem to serve the
antitrust policy alone, it is submitted that the railroads could not possibly
carry out their obligations under the Interstate Commerce Commission
without substantial rate-making machinery. Conversely, if Georgia and
the Department of Justice should lose their suits, the rate agencies would
seem to be free to engage, without court or commission restraint, in fixing
rates. The method of rate-making by agencies seems eminently practicable, formulated and sanctioned by long experience. It appears that
doubt and opposition exist only on the questions of certain activities of
the agencies and of supervision of the agencies. The truth of this appears
irrefutably borne out by the hearings on the Bulwinkle Bill before a
House of Representatives subcommittee. Those hearings, extending to
419 pages and including hundreds of comments of shippers, common carriers, regulatory officials, and members of the public from all sections of
the country, contain only two adverse opinions on the objectives of the
bill, a telegram in general terms from Governor Arnall, and a letter,
general in terms as to the objectives of the bill, from the Attorney
131
General.
Therefore, the question of policy is one only of supervision of ratemaking agencies. And it would seem from the nature of that task and
the context of our administrative law experience that such supervision
can be more constantly and efficiently administered by the Commission
than by sporadic suits by the Justice Department.
Finally, it should be said that Congress has ample precedent for
immunizing the rate-making functions of the railroads from antitrust
suits and placing those functions under the supervision and control of
the Commission. In the parallel situation of air commerce Congress has
so protected the air companies and has given to the Civil Aeronautics
Board the responsibility of supervising collective rate-fixing among the
air lines.1 32 In the parallel situation of common carriers .by water in
" 'Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 5664, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
"1Ibid. It appears that the Justice Department has since become more violently,
if not specifically, opposed to this bill. See N. Y. Times, April 12, 1946, p. 31,
col."852
4. STAT. 1004 (1938), 49 U. S. C. §494 (1940).
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foreign commerce a similar situation obtains under the Maritime Commission.' 33 And under Section 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act the
Interstate Commerce Commission already has authority to relieve the
railroads of prosecution under the antitrust laws with reference to
mergers, consolidations and related matters under the control of the
34
Commission.1
The conclusion, if Congress wants to take it, is obvious; an indicated
course is clear. However, no proper judgment within the limits of this
paper, can be made on the ultimate wisdom of this indicated course.
Whatever may be done as any additional measure of control about placing rate agencies under the supervision of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Department of Justice is deeply opposed to what it would
consider an abridgment of free enterprise: the further proposed step
of completely excusing common carriers, in, those rate-making processes,
from possible antitrust suits; and this has been the Department's opinion
all along with reference to all common carriers by rail, water, air, and
3 5
highway'
To the final question of more or less free competition, more or less
governmental supervision, sponsoring, and protection of common carriers, we the people must give the final answer.
39
18454
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734 (1916), 46 U. S. C. §814 (1940).
905, 49 U. S. C. §5 (1940) ; New York Central Securities Corp.

v. United
States,JUSTiCE
287 U.INS.TRAN
12, 25,PoRTATIoN
26 (1932). (1945), passim.
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